Abstract-Data security becomes more and more important in telemammography which uses a public high-speed wide area network connecting the examination site with the mammography expert center. Generally, security is characterized in terms of privacy, authenticity and integrity of digital data. Privacy is a network access issue and is not considered in this paper. We present a method, authenticity and integrity of digital mammography, here which can meet the requirements of authenticity and integrity for mammography image (IM) transmission.
B
REAST cancer is the fourth most common cause of death among women in the United States [1] . Current attempts to control breast cancer concentrate on early detection by means of massive screening, via periodic mammography and physical examination, because ample evidence indicates that such screening indeed can be effective in lowering the death rate [2] . Today, film-screen mammography is the most common and effective technique for the detection of breast cancer. However, the film-screen image recording system of current mammography has several technical limitations that can reduce breast cancer diagnostic accuracy. Digital mammography can overcome most of the problems existing in film-screen mammography, and at the same time provide additional features not available with standard film-screen mammographic imaging such as contrast enhancement, digital archiving, and computer-aided diagnosis.
Currently, many major manufactures are developing FFDM. As an example, the characteristics of the digital mammography system used for this study include [3] : The imaging area is a rectangular of 240 300 mm ; The spatial resolution of a generated image is about 50 50 m /pixel which is approximately equivalent to nine line-pairs (lp)/mm; The matrix size of the image is 4096 5625 (4K 5.5K) pixels. Each pixel has 12-bit information but is stored in 2 bytes with the four MSBs 16, 15, 14, 13 as zeros. Other manufacturers' digital mammography units may have different specifications, but in general, each digital mammogram is between 40 and 50 Mbytes.
Digital mammography uses the DICOM standard [4] in which the patient information including name, birth date, home address, gender, and history are included in the object classes. This information is sensitive to the patient and important for radiologist's diagnosis.
0278-0062/01$10.00 © 2001 IEEE Telemammography requires the use of FFDM units at the examination site and is built on the concept of an expert center [5] . It allows radiologists with the greatest interpretive expertise to manage and read in real time all mammography examinations. Specifically, in principle, telemammography increases efficiency, facilitates consultation and second reading, improves patient compliance, facilitates operation, supports computer-aided detection and diagnosis, allows centralized archive, distributive reading, and enhances education through telemonitoring. Some of these advantages are being validated in clinical research environment [3] , [5] - [7] , [10] uses a high speed tele-imaging WAN connecting the examination site with the mammography expert center, so that IMs from a remote examination site can be sent to the expert center in almost real time.
Data security becomes a very important issue when mammographic images are transmitted in a public network. Fig. 1 gives an example of a digital mammogram with artificial calcifications inserted. Fig. 1(a) is the original mammogram, (b) is the mammogram with artificial calcifications added, (c) is the magnification of a region containing some added artifacts, and (d) is the subtracted images between the original and the modified mammogram. With current digital technology, it is fairly easy to make modifications in a digital image. For this reason, image data integrity becomes an important issue in a public network environment. Generally, trust in digital data is characterized in terms of privacy, authenticity and integrity of the data. Privacy refers to denial of access to information by unauthorized individuals. Authenticity refers to validating the source of a message; i.e., that it was transmitted by a properly identified sender and is not a replay of a previously transmitted message. Integrity refers to the assurance that the data was not modified accidentally or deliberately in transit, by replacement, insertion or deletion. All the above three aspects should be considered in a telemammography system. Many techniques can be used for data protection including network firewall, data encryption, and data embedding. Various techniques are used under different situations. For a telemammography system, since data cannot be limited within a private local area network protected by a firewall, data encryption and data embedding are the most useful approaches to adopt.
Modern cryptography can use either private-key or the public-key methods [8] , [17] - [21] Private-key cryptography (symmetric cryptography) uses the same key for data encryption and decryption. It requires both the sender and the receiver agree on a key a priori before they can exchange message securely. Although computation speed of performing private-key cryptography is acceptable, it is difficult for key management. Public-key cryptography (asymmetric cryptography) uses two different keys (a key pair) for encryption and decryption. The keys in a key pair are mathematically related, but it is computationally infeasible to deduce one key from the other. In public-key cryptography, the public-key can be made public. Anyone can use the public-key to encrypt a message, but only the owner of the corresponding private-key can decrypt it. Public-key methods are much more convenient to use because they do not share the key management problem inherent in private-key methods. However they require longer time for encryption and decryption. In real-world implementation, public keys are rarely used to encrypt actual messages. Instead, public-key cryptography is used to distribute symmetric keys which are used to encrypt and decrypt actual messages. DS is a major application of public-key cryptography [9] . To generate a signature on an image, the owner of the private key first computes a condensed representation of the image known as an image hash value which is then encrypted by using the mathematical techniques specified in public-key cryptography to produce a DS. Any party with access to the owner's public key, image, and signature can verify the signature by the following procedure: first compute the image hash value with the same algorithm for the received image, decrypt the signature with the owner's public key to obtain the hash value computed by the owner, and compare the two image hash values. Since the mechanism of obtaining the hash is designed in such a way that even a slight change in the input string would cause the hash value to change drastically. If the two hash value are the same, the receiver (or any other party) has the confidence that the image had been signed off by the owner of the private key and that the image had not been altered after it was signed off.
In this paper, we discuss how to implement data security in a telemammography system by using existing cryptography techniques. Since privacy is a network access security issue and will not be discussed here, we will concentrate on IMs and related patient data authenticity and integrity.
II. METHODS
A general description of the algorithm is shown in Fig. 2 . A telemammography system generally consists of an examination site and an expert center, and images are transmitted from the are private key of the examination site and public key of the expert center, respectively; Right: data extraction and decryption. P ; P are private key of the expert center and public key of the examination site, respectively. examination site to the expert center for interpretation. Different from text files, IMs have two distinct characteristics. First, the image size is very large. Each DICOM formatted image includes a small size header file containing sensitive patient information data and a very large image pixel data file. Second, in a 16-b/pixel mammography unit the actual signal, in general, is between 12 and 14 bits, therefore, the LSB (the first bit) in each pixel is noise. This bit can be used for data embedding. Considering these characteristics, a hybrid cryptography algorithm is used to implement image authenticity and integrity in the telemammography system. When a digital mammogram is acquired at the examination site, a DS for all pixels of the image is produced and related patient data is obtained from the DICOM header. Then, both the DS and patient data are encrypted to form a digital envelope. Finally, the digital envelope is embedded into the LSB of randomly selected pixels of the image.
A. Data Encryption and Embedding

1) Image Preprocessing:
This includes segmentation of breast region and acquiring patient information from the DICOM image header. A digital mammogram can be from 4K 5K pixels to even larger sizes. By cropping large amounts of background pixels from the image, the time necessary for performing image hashing and transmission can be significantly reduced. The cropping can be done by finding the minimum rectangle covering the breast region. A method to find the minimum rectangle is given in [10] and [11] . Extracting the boundary of breast region can guarantee that data embedding is performed within the region. If the minimum rectangle is the complete image, then embedding will be performed in the entire image. Data embedded within breast tissues would be more difficult to be decoded than embedded in the background area.
2) Hashing (ID): Compute the hash value for all pixels in the image (1) where hash value of the image; MD5 hashing algorithm; preprocessed mammogram. MD5 has the characteristics of a one-way hash function [12] . It is easy to generate a hash given an image but virtually impossible to generate the image given a hash value . Also, MD5 is "collision-resistant". It is computationally difficult to find two images that have the same hash value. In other words, the chance of two images have the same hash value is small and it depends on the hash algorithm used [12] .
Based on our experience with current FFDM units, the LSB of pixels in the mammogram is mostly noise (see Figs. 8 & 9 ).
It can be used for data embedding. This bit is excluded when calculating the image hash. Thus, only 11 bits in two bytes for each pixel in the image are used to compute the hash (shift the pixel "right" for 1 bit, then set bit 16, 15, 14, 13, and 12 as zero).
3) DS: Produce a DS based on the above image hash value (2) where DS of the mammogram; RSA public-key encryption algorithm [13] ; private key of the examination site. 4) Digital Envelope: Concatenate the DS, and the patient data together as a data stream, and encrypt them using the DES algorithm [14] (3) where data encrypted by DES; DES encryption algorithm; session key produced randomly by the cryptography library; concatenated data stream of the DS and patient information. The DES session key is further encrypted (4) where is the encrypted session key, and is the public key of the expert center.
Finally, the digital envelope is produced by concatenating the encrypted data stream and encrypted session key together (5)
5) Data Embedding:
Replace the LSB of a random pixel in the segmented mammogram by one bit of the digital envelope bit stream and repeat for all bits in the bit stream.
First, a set of pseudorandom numbers is generated by using the standard random generator shown in (6) (6) where multiplier; additive constant; mod denoting the modulus operation. Equation (6) represents the standard linear congruential generator, the three parameters are determined by the size of the image. In our experiment, , , and were set to be 2416, 37444, and 1771875, respectively, based on our experience with the digital mammography unit used.
To start, both the examination site and the expert center decided a random number , called the seed. The seed is then the single number through which a set of random numbers is generated using (6) . Unlike other computer network security problems in key-management, the number of expert sites and examination sites are limited in telemammography application, the seed-management issue can be easily handled between a mutual agreement between both sites.
Second, a random walk sequence in the whole segmented image is obtained (7) where location of th randomly selected pixel in the segmented mammogram; total number of pixels in the segmented mammogram; mod defined in (6). Finally, the bit stream in the envelope described in (5) is embedded into the LSB of each of these randomly selected pixels along the walk sequence.
B. Data Extraction and Decryption
In the expert center, the digital mammogram along with the digital envelope are received. We can check the image authenticity and integrity by verifying the DS in the envelope using a series of reverse procedures. First, the same walk sequence in the image is generated by using the same seed known to the examination site, so that the embedded digital envelope can be extracted correctly from the LSBs of these randomly selected pixels. Then, the encrypted session key in the digital envelope is restored (8) where is the RSA public-key decryption algorithm, is the private key of the expert center. After that, the digital envelope can be opened by the recovered session key, and the DS and the patient data in (3) can be obtained (9) where is the DES decryption algorithm. Finally, the ID is recovered by decrypting the DS (10) where is the public key of the examination site. At the same time, a second image hash value is calculated from the received image with the same hash algorithm shown in (1) used by the examination site. If the recovered image hash value from (10) and the second image hash value match, then the expert center can be assured that this image is really from the examination site, and that none of the pixels in the image had been modified. Therefore, the requirements of image authentication and integrity has been satisfied. RSAREF toolkit (RSAref 2.0, released by RSA Data Security, Inc.) was used to implement the data encryption part in the AIDM.
C. Digital IMs
FFDM images including large and small breasts had been tested with the AIDM. As shown in Fig. 2 , in the examination site, the input is a full-field digital mammogram (Fisher Medical Imaging Corporation, Denver, CO), and the output is the image with the digital envelop embedded. In the expert center, experts can manipulate the embedded IM and verify its authenticity and integrity.
III. RESULTS
Following results are an example obtained from one mammogram. Fig. 3(a) shows the unprocessed image, and Fig. 3(b) the image with background removed. Both images are shown to demonstrate the difference in size before and after background removed. Fig. 4 (a) and (b) shows the MD5 hash value and the DS, respectively, of the background removed mammogram in hexadecimal format. Fig. 5(a) is the merged data file of DS and patient information. Fig. 5(b) is the digital envelope [see (5) ] which is going to be embedded into the image. From this figure, we can see the digital envelope is totally incomprehensible. Fig. 6 , from left to right, represents the original mammogram, the mammogram in which the digital envelope has been embedded, and the subtracted image between the original and embedded mammogram, respectively. By comparing the original 4K 4K image and the embedded image from two adjacent DICOM Gray Scale Standard 2K 2K monitors, using a magnifying glass tool for a true 4 K resolution image, we found the embedded image has no visual quality degradation based on results from three random image sets. Also, from the subtracted image, we can see the pixels selected for data embedding are fully random and within the region of breast tissues. In this example, the total pixels in which the LSBs were changed during data embedding are 3404 which accounts for 0.12% of the total pixels in breast tissue region. It is seen from Fig. 5(b) that there are 840 characters or 840 8 bits 6720 bits. During embedding, only 3404 bits are required to be changed because 3316 bits in the bit stream are identical to the LSBs of the randomly selected pixels).
The % pixel changed can be computed by Total % Pixel changed no. characters in envelope bits unaffected LSBs % (11)
The time required to run the algorithm depends on the image size. In this case, the unsegmented image size is about 46 Mbytes, the time required is approximately 37 s total for signing the signature, sealing the envelope, and embedding data for the segmented image. For the unsegmented image, it will be about 6 times longer because the segmented image is less than 15% of the unsegmented image, and the algorithm is mostly linear search.
In the expert center, one can verify image authenticity and integrity as well as patient information by using the correct seed to extract the digital envelope; the correct private key of the expert center to open the envelope; and the correct public key of the examination site to verify the image signature. Image authenticity is confirmed if all keys used in the expert center match with their corresponding one used in the examination site. Any modifications of the image are easily detected by the signature verification in the expert center. Fig. 7 shows an example of the image hash calculated from the received mammogram in the expert center if the value of one randomly selected pixel was changed from 14 to 12. Comparing Fig. 7 with the original image hash produced in the examination site shown in Fig. 4(a) demonstrates the drastic difference of the hash value by such a slight change of one pixel value. Table I shows the time required using the AIDM to process the mammogram shown in Fig. 3 . Although results are only based on one image, nevertheless it provides a glimpse to the time required for such algorithm. The procedures of embedding data and extracting data refer to embedding data into the mammogram and extracting data from the embedded mammogram, respectively. For signing the signature and verifying the signature, most of the time is taken by computing image hash value. The purpose of this table is to show the relative time required for encryption and decryption processes. We did not make any effort to optimize the algorithm nor the programming.
IV. DISCUSSION
DS can be used to verify image authenticity and integrity. Generally, a DS is attached to the head or the end of the image data file. In this paper, we present an algorithm, AIDM, by embedding the DS and some sensitive information such as patient ID into the image itself. Comparing to appending the DS on the head or at the end of the file, our method has several advantages. First, it does not change the file size. Second, it does Fig. 7 . The MD5 hash value of the data embedded mammogram after the value of one randomly selected pixel in the image was changed from 14 to 12. It is totally different with the hash shown in Fig. 4(a) .
not need to redefine the file format. These two advantages have an add-on value that the embedded image still confirms with the DICOM image format standard which is very important for medical image communications. Finally, because the embedded envelope in the image is invisible, it would be difficult to be removed deliberately or undeliberately. Our embedding method is suitable for medical images because they have 12-14 b signals/pixel in a 16b/pixel storage allocation allowing the LSB for data embedding. Using public-key cryptography allows a better key-management. Both the examination site and the expert center can publish their public key and keep their private key secretly by themselves. Since in the examination site the image data file is encrypted by using its own private key and the public key of the expert center, and in the expert center the image file is decrypted by using its own private key and the public key of the examination site, there is no need to use a secure channel to exchange keys. However, the security of public-key cryptography depends on the validation of public key certificate which has not been considered in our method right now. With the development of the public key infrastructure (PKI), it would become easier to get and validate public key certificate from a certificate authority.
Many of the less-significant bits in live "natural" images are noise caused by the imaging acquisition device. From a visual standpoint, the noise at this bit level is entirely masked by the complexity of the scene [15] . Digital mammography is not an exception. Fig. 8(a) and (b) depicts the visual aspect of the in- dividual bit planes and the accumulative bit planes [16] of the digital mammogram shown in Fig. 3 , respectively. In Fig. 8(a) , the right-most in the bottom row displays the MSB (bit 12). Moving from right to left, bottom to top row, the next MSBs are 11, 10, 9, 8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1, respectively. Individual bit planes demonstrate whether image information is presented at each bit. It can be seen that the more close to bit 1, the less useful information the bit contains. For the LSB (bit 1), no noticeable structural information can be observed. In Fig. 8(b) , the top left image displays the MSB. Moving from left to right, and top to bottom, the next MSB is added to the previous one:
. The last image in the second row is the original. Accumulative bit planes shows the contribution of those bit planes to the image. No visual differences between the original and the image next to the original in the second row are observed. This means that the LSB has nearly no contribution to the whole image. The first row of Fig. 9(a) and (b) , from left to right, is a region of 800 800 pixels randomly selected, then fixed from individual bit planes of bit , and 12. The second row of (a) and (b) are the frequency spectrum of the Fourier transform of corresponding regional images, respectively. The spectrum of the LSB image is nearly uniformly distributed, signifying that it represents random noise.
The AIDM works well in digital mammograms for two reasons. First, pixels in a mammogram is highly correlated. Second, the LSB of each pixel in the image is mostly noise as demonstrated in Figs. 8 and 9 . Although only 12 bits of 2 bytes are used in mammograms, data embedding should not be performed on the 13, 14, 15, or 16 bit because some image compression algorithms may clip these bits during image acquisition and/or archive.
Currently, we are using RSAREF toolkit (RSAref 2.0, released by RSA Data Security, Inc.) to implement the data encryption part in the AIDM. At the research stage, RSAREF toolkit is an appropriate cryptographic tool since it is free for noncommercial use. Two aspects should be considered in the future work: the speed of the algorithm both in encryption and decryption, and the key management.
Our results demonstrate that embedding DS into a mammogram using standard data encryption technique is an effective method for verifying image authenticity and integrity in telemammography. We are in the process of implementing the AIDM method in our telemammography system which consists of two FFDM units, three digital mammogram workstations, one archive server connecting to the department clinical picture archiving and communication systems. These components located in two UCSF campuses are linked together by an asynchronous transfer mode OC-12 (622 Mb/s) Sonet ring with an OC-3 (155 Mb/s) drop at each connection. The AIDM can be extended to other teleradiology applications. In these cases, both the noise bit and the pixel correlation of the imaging modality under consideration need to be investigated a priori.
